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 
Abstract—We study constrained general-sum stochastic games with unknown Markovian dynamics. A distributed 
constrained no-regret Q-learning scheme (CNRQ) is presented to guarantee convergence to the set of stationary correlated 
equilibria of the game. Prior art addresses the unconstrained case only, is structured with nested control loops, and has no 
convergence result. CNRQ is cast as a single-loop three-timescale asynchronous stochastic approximation algorithm with 
set-valued update increments. A rigorous convergence analysis with differential inclusion arguments is given which draws 
on recent extensions of the theory of stochastic approximation to the case of asynchronous recursive inclusions with set-
valued mean fields. Numerical results are given for the exemplary application of CNRQ to decentralized resource control 
in heterogeneous wireless networks (HetNets).  
Index Terms— Asynchronous stochastic approximation, constrained stochastic game, correlated equilibrium, multi-
agent systems, no-regret learning, Q-learning. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Research Background 
Stochastic games [1] are very broad framework, generalizing both Markov decision processes (MDPs) and repeated 
games. In particular, stochastic games are extensions of MDPs to the multi-agent case, and of repeated games to the 
multi-state case. A stochastic game is played in a sequence of stages. At the beginning of each stage, the game is in a 
certain state. The agents select their actions, and each agent receives a reward that depends on both the current state 
and the action profile of all the agents. The game then transitions to a new state with a certain probability which, by 
Markov property, depends only on the previous state and the actions chosen by all agents. This process recurs at the 
new state, and the interaction goes on for a finite or infinite number of stages. Similarly to the case with MDPs, each 
agent participating in a stochastic game aims to maximize an expected cumulative reward measure often calculated as 
either average reward per stage or total discounted reward. However, the solution concept differs from the case of 
MDPs in that the agents should settle instead for competitive optimality which corresponds to some notion of strategic 
equilibrium. The most common notions of equilibria are Nash [2] and correlated equilibria [3]. A Nash equilibrium 
(NE) is a vector of independent strategies, each of which is a probability distribution over actions, in which each agent’s 
strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other agents. Correlated equilibrium (CE) is more general than NE in that 
it allows for dependencies among agents’ strategies: a CE is a probability distribution over the agents’ joint actions 
such that if a joint action is drawn from this distribution (presumably by a trusted third party), and each agent is told 
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separately its own component, then it has no incentive to choose a different action, because, assuming that all others 
also obey, the suggested action is the best in expectation.  
Stochastic games are particularly appealing since they capture both the strategic and stochastic aspects of a real-
world scenario. Stochastic games with constraints [4] are even more interesting as they can also account for multiple 
objectives or for bounds on consumption of resources. In constrained stochastic games, the agents incur an additional 
cost at each stage which, similarly to the instantaneous reward, is a function of both the current state and the current 
action profile of the agents. The equilibrium policy should then be feasible under the agents’ individual 
average/discounted constraints. Computational methods for equilibria in stochastic games have been actively pursued 
over the past decades. The majority of the schemes work in an offline fashion, i.e., for the case where Markovian 
dynamics (transition probabilities) are known a priori. Under this assumption, an extensive account on solution 
methods for stochastic games with special structures and with various reward criteria is given in [5]. Constrained 
stochastic games are typically approached via mathematical programming. See [4] and [6] for treatments of constrained 
games with jointly-controlled and independently-controlled state processes, respectively. 
However, when Markovian dynamics are unknown, one may instead resort to learning-theoretic online solutions. It 
is within this perspective that stochastic games are also proposed as the standard framework for multi-agent 
reinforcement learning (MARL) [7]. Given the complexity of the strategy space in stochastic games, the solution 
concept sought in MARL algorithms is typically expressed in terms of stationary policies. The stationarity of a policy 
implies that it depends on the history of the game only through the current state. Traditionally, the MARL literature’s 
prime interest has been directed towards learning stationary NE. Such equilibria have been shown to exist for both 
discounted and average reward stochastic games, with an extra ergodicity assumption on the transition structure of the 
latter [5]. These existence results also carry over to the constrained case, albeit with an additional strong Slater 
feasibility condition [4]. MARL algorithms for the computation of stationary NE in infinite-horizon general-sum 
stochastic games are primarily proposed for the unconstrained case. Depending on their informational assumptions, 
these algorithms can be divided into two broad classes: joint action learning (JAL) and independent action learning 
(IAL). 
JAL algorithms constitute the early research on learning equilibria in stochastic games. These algorithms learn in 
the joint action space, and thus require that each agent observe the actions and possibly the rewards of the other agents. 
Prominent examples are Nash-Q for discounted stochastic games [8], its variant, Nash-R [9] for average reward games, 
and FF-Q [10]. These are all multi-agent extensions of the celebrated Q-learning scheme of the MDP literature [11], 
with the distinction that they maintain Q-values for all possible joint actions at a given state. The major drawback 
associated with the current instances of JAL algorithms is that they all require repeated calls to an NE solver during 
the learning process, and this solver needs that the agents’ Q-values be public information. Also, the convergence 
results are limited to a restricted class of games (e.g., common interest or zero-sum). In IAL algorithms, on the other 
hand, the agents only rely on their own past received rewards without knowing the actions or rewards of the other 
agents. IAL algorithms can thus operate in more informationally opaque scenarios, and unlike the case with JAL 
algorithms, their memory footprint is not exponential in the number of agents. A pioneer IAL algorithm is WOLF-
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PHC [12] which is only empirically evaluated and its convergence is not theoretically analyzed. The MG-ILA algorithm 
in [13] is based on an inter-connected learning automata abstraction and is only provably convergent in average reward 
games with pure NE policies. Finally, an ON-SGSP algorithm [14] has recently been proposed which is proved to be 
generally convergent to stationary NE policies in discounted games.  
In this article, we depart from the NE-centric mainstream of MARL research, and instead address the problem of 
learning stationary CE in stochastic games [15]. The importance of CE arises from the fact that unlike NE, the concept 
of CE permits coordination between agents, and CE that are not NE can achieve higher rewards than NE, by avoiding 
positive probability mass on less desirable outcomes; in fact, CE payoffs in a one-shot game can fall outside the convex 
hull of all NE payoffs, and hence the former can make all players better off than the latter [3]. Within the context of 
normal-form games, the most efficient procedure for learning CE is the no-regret algorithm [16][17]. No-regret 
learning essentially requires that agents depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to 
measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It is shown in [16] that once all the players’ regrets 
approach zero, the joint empirical frequency of play converges with probability one to the set of CE of the game. A 
key property of no-regret learning is that it is an uncoupled update rule [18],[19]; i.e., each agent only needs to know 
its own reward function and to monitor the actions taken by the others to adjust its play probabilities. 
When it comes to stochastic games, however, the literature on learning CE is very thin. The existence of stationary 
CE is implied by the existence of stationary NE in general-sum stochastic games. A direct proof is also given in [15] 
using a fixed point argument. As for the algorithms, CE-Q [20] and QnR [20][21] are the only MARL algorithms we 
know of that address the problem of learning stationary CE. Both algorithms belong to the JAL family, and use Q-
learning to estimate the joint action values for each state of the game. Similarly to Nash-Q, CE-Q relies on an 
equilibrium solver with access to all agents’ Q-tables to update the CE policy in each iteration. Given the structural 
simplicity of CE w.r.t. to NE (convex polytope vs. fixed points), each call to a CE solver requires solving a set of linear 
inequalities, as opposed to an NE solver which has to deal with a nonlinear program. Yet again, the convergence results 
for CE-Q are limited to zero-sum and common-interest games only. QnR [20][21], on the other hand, is a fully 
decentralized algorithm. Realizing that a no-regret algorithm can serve as a natural learning backdrop for the agents to 
reach CE, QnR eliminates the calls to a bulky equilibrium solver by interfacing Q-learning with no-regret-learning in 
a nested loop configuration. In the outer loop, the agents update their Q-values based on the empirical frequency of 
play that arises from the no-regret algorithm in the inner loop. The inner loop is in itself a virtual game governed by 
no-regret updates to which Q-values from the outer loop are fed as the agents’ rewards. Hence, each iteration of the 
outer loop should essentially await the asymptotic convergence of the inner loop to zero-regret play probabilities. 
QnR’s main advantage is that it works without the luxury of a CE solver, and thus the agents’ Q-tables remain private. 
In fact, owing to the uncoupledness of the no-regret algorithm, all an agent needs to observe is its opponents’ play at 
each stage. Hence, QnR itself can also be regarded as an uncoupled learning rule. The convergence of the algorithm, 
however, has not been analyzed in [21]. Moreover, it is challenging in practice to synchronize the agents for a virtual 
game in between two actual plays. Finally, the QnR’s nested loop configuration also makes it difficult to extend the 
algorithm to a constrained stochastic game setup. 
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B. Contributions and Outline 
In this paper, we take the first step towards re-vitalizing interest in CE-centric MARL research by revamping QnR 
in two ways: i) removing its virtual game interlude, and ii) extending it to also handle constrained games. In particular, 
we make the following contributions: 
 Realizing that no-regret and Q-learning are both variants of stochastic approximation algorithms [17],[22], we 
exploit the multi-timescale extension of the theory of stochastic approximation to operate QnR’s inner and outer 
loops concurrently with two different step-size schedules. More specifically, we recast QnR as a single-loop 
algorithm with no-regret learning moving on an effectively faster timescale than Q-learning. This way, we remove 
the virtual game interlude, while still preserving QnR’s main spirit: no-regret learning sees current Q-values as 
quasi-static, while Q-learning sees the estimated CE as essentially equilibrated. 
 QnR’s recast as a stochastic approximation also makes it readily extensible to constrained setups. To show this, we 
first exploit the methodology in [15] to view the dynamics of the constrained game through the prism of a single 
agent. This is done by having each agent assume all the others adhere to the policy of an imaginary correlation 
device so that the environment reduces to a constrained MDP (CMDP) in its eyes. Using standard Lagrange duality 
[23] and the one-shot deviation principle of MDPs [24] we argue how the realization of CE in stochastic game 
amounts to simultaneous primal maximization in all agents’ CMDPs. With this understanding, we may view the 
coupled iterates on joint policy and Q-values as primal ascent in individual agents’ CMDPs which should then be 
augmented by a dual descent in Lagrange multiplier space. With QnR’s recast as a stochastic approximation, this 
augmentation can be done as easily as running stochastic sub-gradient descent on a slower third timescale. We 
refer to the overall algorithm as constrained no-regret Q-learning (CNR𝑄). 
 Given the set-valued update increments of no-regret learning and the asynchronous nature of Q-learning iterations, 
CNRQ would essentially correspond to a three-timescale asynchronous stochastic approximation with set-valued 
update increments. We give rigorous convergence results with differential inclusion arguments which draw on 
recent extensions of the theory of stochastic approximation to the case of asynchronous recursive inclusions with 
set-valued mean fields. The proof framework is due to Perkins and Leslie [25] who come up with conditions under 
which the asynchronicity of the process can be incorporated into the mean field to yield convergence results similar 
to those of an equivalent synchronous process. We verify that CNRQ in fact satisfies these conditions and thus its 
asymptotic analysis can be facilitated via the arguments in [25]. 
 Finally, we present an example constrained stochastic game setup from the wireless networking domain. We use 
this example as a test bed to evaluate CNRQ’s performance and convergence behavior.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In II, we express the formalism of constrained general-sum stochastic 
games, with emphasis on both individual agent-level and system-wide control problems. In III, we present the 
machinery for learning stationary CE. To this end, we remark on the connection of both Q- and no-regret learning with 
the theory of stochastic approximation, and highlight the main idea in QnR-learning, which paves way for the 
description of our CNRQ algorithm. In IV, we establish CNRQ’s convergence. Finally, in V, we present numerical 
results for application of CNRQ-learning to an exemplary case from wireless networks. We conclude the paper in VI. 
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II. CONSTRAINED GENERAL-SUM STOCHASTIC GAME 
In this section, we begin with some notation and terminology that are associated with the definition of a constrained 
general-sum stochastic game. We then continue by formalizing the decision problem faced by each individual agent in 
II.A, and the social-level control problem in II.B which leads to the definition of a stationary correlated equilibrium. 
Finally, in II.C, we give an example embodiment of the game specification which serves both as a motivation for our 
algorithm in Section III and as a test bench to present numerical experiments in Section V. 
A discrete-time, constrained stochastic game is denoted by a quintuple Γ = 〈𝒦,𝑨, 𝒮, (𝑢𝑘(. ))𝑘∈𝒦 , (𝑐𝑘(. ))𝑘∈𝒦〉. The 
elements constituting Γ are defined as follows (see [4] for similar specifications): 
 Agents. The agents participating in the game are indexed by the set 𝒦 = {1,2,… , 𝐾}, in which 𝐾 = |𝒦| (i.e., the 
cardinality of the set 𝒦). 
 Actions. We use 𝑎𝑘
𝑛 ∈ 𝐴𝑘 to denote the control action of the 𝑘-th agent at time 𝑛=0,1,2,…. Let 𝒂
𝒏 = (𝑎1
𝑛, . . , 𝑎𝐾
𝑛) ∈
𝑨 denote the composition of the actions from all the agents at time 𝑛, where 𝑨 is their joint action space. Also, denote 
by 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 = (𝑎?́?
𝑛)?́?∈𝒦,?́?≠𝑘 the action profile of agent 𝑘’s opponents at time 𝑛. 
 States. The stochastic system state is modeled as a discrete time Markov decision chain (MDC). We use the random 
variable 𝑠𝑛 ∈ 𝒮 = {1,2,… , 𝑆} to indicate the system state at time 𝑛. We denote by 𝒫𝑠𝒂?́? the transition probability 
between states 𝑠 and ?́? under the joint action 𝒂 ∈ 𝑨. 
 Instantaneous Utilities. The utility 𝑢𝑘
𝑛 accrued by each agent 𝑘 choosing an action 𝑎𝑘
𝑛 at time 𝑛 can generally be 
expressed by a function 𝑢𝑘: 𝒮 × 𝑨 → ℯ of both the system state 𝑠
𝑛 and the action profile (𝑎𝑘
𝑛, 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 ). ℯ denotes a 
compact interval in ℝ. 
 Instantaneous Constraints. The immediate cost constraint 𝑐𝑘
𝑛 incurred by each agent 𝑘 from choosing the control 
action 𝑎𝑘
𝑛 at time 𝑛 is specified by a function 𝑐𝑘: 𝒮 × 𝑨 → 𝒹 of both the system state 𝑠
𝑛 and the action profile 
(𝑎𝑘
𝑛, 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 ). 𝒹 denotes a compact interval in ℝ. We specify later that the cost constraints 𝑐𝑘
𝑛 are involved in a long-
term discounted constraint to be satisfied by the 𝑘-th agent. 
 Stationary Randomized Joint Policies. Since we are interested in the set of CE of the game, it is easier to abstractly 
assume that there is a trusted third party (a referee or a correlation device in game-theoretic parlance) in the 
environment which is in charge of issuing recommendations to the agents at each stage of the game. Let 𝝅𝑠(. ) be 
the policy used by the referee to sample joint plays at state 𝑠. 𝝅𝑠(. ) is defined to be stationary in that it is a 
randomization over the joint action space 𝑨 given only the current state 𝑠 and is independent of the history of the 
game. Each entry 𝝅𝑠(𝑎𝑘 , 𝒂−𝑘) represents the joint probability of taking action 𝑎𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝑘 by agent 𝑘 and action profile 
𝒂−𝑘 ∈ 𝑨−𝑘 by others at state 𝑠. We denote the entire set of the referee’s joint policies over all states by Π ≜ ∆(𝑨)
|𝒮|; 
i.e., 𝝅𝑠(. ) ∈ ∆(𝑨). 
The 𝑛-th stage of the game Γ unfolds as follows: all agents and the referee observe the system state 𝑠𝑛; based on its 
policy 𝝅𝑠𝑛(. ), the referee recommends an action 𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓,𝑛
 to each agent 𝑘. Given its recommendation, each 𝑘 chooses an 
action 𝑎𝑘
𝑛, and the joint action 𝒂𝑛 is played. Every agent 𝑘 accrues its payoff 𝑢𝑘(𝑠
𝑛, 𝒂𝑛), and incurs cost 𝑐𝑘(𝑠
𝑛, 𝒂𝑛). 
The play proceeds to stage (𝑛 + 1) where 𝑠𝑛+1 is determined probabilistically according to 𝒫𝑠𝑛𝒂𝑛𝑠𝑛+1. 
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A. Individual Agent’s Control Problem 
Assume all other agents but 𝑘 play according to the referee’s policy 𝝅. Knowing 𝝅 and given its recommended play 
𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
 at state 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, the agent 𝑘 can form a posteriori belief about the joint opponents’ play 𝒂−𝑘: 
𝝅𝑠(𝒂−𝑘| 𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
) =
𝝅𝑠(𝒂−𝑘 ,  𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓)
∑ 𝝅𝑠(𝒃−𝑘,  𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓)𝒃−𝑘∈𝑨−𝑘
. (1) 
Hence, from the point of view of the 𝑘-th agent, the environment reduces to a constrained MDP. Similarly to [15], 
in this MDP, we may break down the 𝑛-th stage of the play (from 𝑛 = 1,2,… onward) as: agent 𝑘 first observes the 
actions 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛−1 taken by its opponents in the previous round of Γ, perceives the payoff 𝑢𝑘
𝑛−1 it has accrued during the 
(𝑛 − 1)st stage together with its cost constraint 𝑐𝑘
𝑛−1. It then observes the current state 𝑠𝑛, receives its advice 𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓,𝑛
 
from the referee, and chooses an action 𝑎𝑘
𝑛. We denote this CMDP by Μ𝑘 = 〈?̆?𝑘 , ?̆?𝑘, ?̆?𝑘(. ), ?̆?𝑘(. )〉 as follows: 
 Actions. ?̆?𝑘 = 𝐴𝑘. 
 States. ?̆?𝑘 = {(𝒂−𝑘, 𝑠, 𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
) ∈ 𝑨−𝑘 × 𝒮 × 𝐴𝑘  | 𝝅𝑠(𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓) > 0}; i.e., we include in state ?̆?𝑘 of agent 𝑘 from the 
stochastic game Γ, the previous actions of the other agents 𝒂−𝑘, the current state 𝑠, and the referee’s advice 𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
. 
The transition probabilities associated with this new state definition can be calculated as follows: Let ?̆?𝑘 =
(𝒂−𝑘 , 𝑠, 𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
) and ?́̆?𝑘 = (?́?−𝑘 , ?́?, ?́?𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
). We have: 
𝒫?̆?𝑘𝑎𝑘 ?́̆?𝑘 = 𝝅𝑠(?́?−𝑘|𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
). 𝒫𝑠(𝑎𝑘,?́?−𝑘)?́?. 𝝅?́?(?́?𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
). (2) 
 Instantaneous Utility. ?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , ?́̆?𝑘) = 𝑢𝑘(𝑠, (𝑎𝑘 , ?́?−𝑘)). 
 Instantaneous Constraint. ?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘, 𝑎𝑘 , ?́̆?𝑘) = 𝑐𝑘(𝑠, (𝑎𝑘 , ?́?−𝑘)). 
Let ?̆?𝑘,?̆?𝑘(. ), ∀?̆?𝑘 ∈ ?̆?𝑘 denote agent 𝑘’s stationary policy, and consider a discount factor 𝜌 ∈ [0,1]. Then, 𝑘’s 
discounted utility conditioned on initial state ?̆?𝑘 ∈ ?̆?𝑘 is defined as: 
?̆?𝑘,?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘) ≝ 𝔼 [(1 − 𝜌)∑𝜌
𝑛−1?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘
𝑛, 𝑎𝑘
𝑛, ?̆?𝑘
𝑛+1)|?̆?𝑘
1 = ?̆?𝑘
∞
𝑛=1
], (3) 
where, the normalization factor (1 − 𝜌) ensures that the range of ?̅̆?𝑘 falls in the compact set ℯ
|?̆?𝑘| ⊂ ℝ|?̆?𝑘|. Now, for 
∀?̆?𝑘 ∈ ?̆?𝑘, the control problem faced by the 𝑘-th agent can be expressed as follows: 
max
?̆?𝑘
 ?̆?𝑘,?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘) ,  
subject to the expected discounted cost constraint: (4) 
𝔼 [(1 − 𝜌)∑𝜌𝑛−1?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘
𝑛, 𝑎𝑘
𝑛, ?̆?𝑘
𝑛+1)|?̆?𝑘
1 = ?̆?𝑘
∞
𝑛=1
] ≤ ?̅?𝑘.  
The constrained problem in (4) can be converted into an unconstrained form using standard Lagrangian approach 
[23],[26]. Let 𝜆𝑘 ≥ 0 be a real number, called the Lagrange multiplier (LM). For agent 𝑘, define the instantaneous 
Lagrangian ℓ̆𝑘:ℝ
+ × ?̆?𝑘 × 𝐴𝑘 × ?̆?𝑘 → 𝒸, where 𝒸 is a compact interval whose boundaries can be specified from ℯ, 𝒹, 
and by ensuring that 𝜆𝑘 is within an interval, say [0,𝑀𝐴𝑋] ⊂ ℝ
+. The function ℓ̆𝑘 is defined as: 
ℓ̆𝑘(𝜆𝑘, ?̆?𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 , ?́̆?𝑘) ≝ ?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘, 𝑎𝑘 , ?́̆?𝑘) − 𝜆𝑘(?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘, 𝑎𝑘 , ?́̆?𝑘) − ?̅?𝑘). (5) 
For  ∀?̆?𝑘 ∈ ?̆?𝑘, the expected total discounted Lagrangian associated with (5) is as follows: 
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ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (?̆?𝑘) ≝ ?̆?𝑘,?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘) − 𝜆𝑘[?̆?𝑘,?̆?𝑘(?̆?𝑘) − ?̅?𝑘] = 𝔼 [(1 − 𝜌)∑𝜌
𝑛ℓ̆𝑘(𝜆𝑘, ?̆?𝑘
𝑛, 𝑎𝑘
𝑛, ?̆?𝑘
𝑛+1)|?̆?𝑘
1 = ?̆?𝑘
∞
𝑛=1
]. (6) 
The unconstrained counterpart to (4) is to determine the optimal pair (?̆?𝑘
∗ , 𝜆𝑘
∗ ) such that the following saddle point 
optimality condition holds for ∀?̆?𝑘 ∈ ?̆?𝑘 [26]: 
ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘
∗
(?̆?𝑘) ≤
 ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘
∗
(?̆?𝑘
∗) ≤ ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (?̆?𝑘
∗). (7) 
With the (7) satisfied, ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘
∗
(?̆?𝑘
∗) is the optimal value of the problem (4), and it can be computed as [26]: 
ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘
∗
(?̆?𝑘
∗) =  min
𝜆𝑘≥0
max
?̆?𝑘
ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (?̆?𝑘) , ∀?̆?𝑘 ∈ ?̆?𝑘. (8) 
However, in the setup described by Γ, the maximization in (8) is solved concurrently by all agents, which undermines 
our simplifying single-agent abstraction. Next, we introduce a system-wide objective, which, when realized, amounts 
to ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (?̆?𝑘) being maximized simultaneously for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. 
B. System-Wide Objective: Stationary Correlated Equilibria 
Before giving a formal definition of stationary CE, we first express the long-term discounted Lagrangian of agent 𝑘 
under the assumption that all agents (including 𝑘) follow the recommendations from a given referee’s policy 𝝅. Let 
𝝀 = [𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝐾]
𝑇 be a fixed vector of LMs for ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. Similarly to Π, define Π𝝀 as the set of all stationary joint 
policies for the unconstrained version of the game Γ with 𝜆𝑘-parameterized individual Lagrangian utilities (denoted by 
Γ𝝀 for easier reference). We have for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮: 
ℒ𝑘,𝑠
𝜆𝑘 (𝝅) = 𝔼 [(1 − 𝜌)∑𝜌𝑛ℓ𝑘(𝜆𝑘, 𝑠
𝑛, 𝒂𝒏)|𝑠0 = 𝑠
∞
𝑛=0
],   (9) 
where, ℓ𝑘(𝜆𝑘, 𝑠, 𝒂) ≝ 𝑢𝑘(𝑠, 𝒂) − 𝜆𝑘(𝑐𝑘(𝑠, 𝒂) − ?̅?𝑘). It is well-known that ℒ𝑘,𝑠
𝜆𝑘  has the following standard dynamic 
programming expansion (a.k.a. Bellman equations): 
ℒ𝑘,𝑠
𝜆𝑘 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 , 𝝅) =  ∑ 𝝅𝑠(𝒂). 𝑄𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝜆𝑘 ,
𝒂∈𝒜
     ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 (10) 
where, ℒ𝑘,𝑠
𝜆𝑘  is defined with an abuse of notation by making its dependence on 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 explicit. 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘: 𝒸|𝒮| → 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| is a 
|𝒮 × 𝑨|-dimensional 𝜆𝑘-parameterized mapping whose (𝑠, 𝒂)-th component evaluated at ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘 is defined as: 
𝑄𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝜆𝑘 (ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘) = (1 − 𝜌). 𝔼[ℓ𝑘(𝜆𝑘, 𝑠, 𝒂)] + 𝜌∑𝒫𝑠𝒂?́?
?́?∈𝒮
ℒ𝑘,?́?
𝜆𝑘 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 , 𝝅). (11) 
Clearly, 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 is an affine function of ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘, and the value function ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘: 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| × Π𝝀 → 𝒸|𝒮| is a bilinear function of the 
policy 𝝅 and action value function 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘. The dependence of ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘 on the policy as well as the inter-dependence of ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘 
and 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 is made explicit only on few occasions for emphasis. This dependence is otherwise suppressed to simplify 
notation. Now, we are ready to define  Γ𝝀’s set of stationary CE. 
Definition 1. The set ∁𝑐𝑒
𝝀 ⊂ Π𝝀 is called the set of stationary CE of the stochastic game Γ𝝀 if under each 𝝅𝑐𝑒 ∈ ∁𝑐𝑒
𝝀 , 
it holds that for each agent 𝑘, for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, for ∀𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓 ∈ 𝐴𝑘 with 𝝅𝑠
𝑐𝑒(𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓) > 0, and any alternative action ?́?𝑘 ∈ 𝐴𝑘: 
∑ 𝝅𝑠
𝑐𝑒(𝒂−𝑘|𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
). 𝑄
𝑘,(𝑠,(𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
,𝒂−𝑘))
𝜆𝑘 ≥
𝒂−𝑘∈ 𝑨−𝑘
∑ 𝝅𝑠
𝑐𝑒(𝒂−𝑘|𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
). 𝑄
𝑘,(𝑠,(?́?𝑘,𝒂−𝑘))
𝜆𝑘 .
𝒂−𝑘∈ 𝑨−𝑘
 (12) 
8 
 
DRAFT   March 01, 2014 
The inequality in (12) can be better understood if we intuitively consider Γ𝝀 as a set of auxiliary normal-form games 
indexed by 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 and with payoffs 𝑄𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝜆𝑘  (e.g., see [1],[5]). By playing joint action 𝒂 in the 𝑠-th auxiliary game, agent 
𝑘’s payoff is the sum of its instantaneous payoff and the payoff it expects to gain from the next state onward, assuming 
joint policy 𝝅. Now, 𝝅𝑐𝑒 ∈ ∁𝑐𝑒
𝝀  if and only if it is simultaneously a CE for all auxiliary games 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮; i.e., if the referee 
draws its actions from 𝝅𝑐𝑒, 𝑘 realizes that every recommendation 𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑒𝑓
 it receives in each game 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 is a best response 
to the estimated play of the other agents (assuming they all follow their recommendations). Now, we relate this 
collective notion with the agent-level objectives through the following theorem: 
Theorem I. For ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒦,∀?̆?𝑘 ∈ ?̆?𝑘, it holds that:  ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (?̆?𝑘
∗) = ℒ𝑘,𝑠
𝜆𝑘 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 , 𝝅𝑐𝑒).  
Proof. As argued in ([15], Theorem 7), if all other agents but 𝑘 play according to the referee’s policy 𝝅𝑐𝑒, then from 
the point of view of the 𝑘-th agent, the environment reduces to MDP Μ𝑘, defined in II.A. By construction in [15], based 
on the one-shot deviation principle for MDPs [24], the referee’s policy 𝝅𝑐𝑒 is a CE in the stochastic game if and only 
if its implementation in Μ𝑘 is an optimal policy simultaneously for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. It then follows that the expected 
discounted Lagrangian of all agents under the CE policy 𝝅𝑐𝑒 is equal to the expected discounted Lagrangian of the 
corresponding optimal policy in their MDPs.   
Now define Lagrange dual function 𝒢𝑘(𝜆𝑘) ≝ ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 , 𝝅𝑐𝑒) as the solution of the primal problem max
?̆?𝑘
ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (?̆?𝑘) 
for ∀?̆?𝑘 ∈ ?̆?𝑘 in (8). The optimal 𝜆𝑘
∗  can then be obtained by conducting dual descent on 𝒢𝑘,𝑠(𝜆𝑘) for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮. In III, 
we present a distributed learning procedure to compute 𝝅𝑐𝑒 together with the optimal 𝜆𝑘
∗  for ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. 
C. Illustrative Example 
Before delving into the technicalities of learning a stationary CE, we give an illustrative example as typical real-
world problems that can be modeled by the generic game described above. This example is a simplified yet an 
illustrative scenario from the domain of wireless networks which also provides a test bench to demonstrate both the 
convergence behavior as well as the efficacy of the algorithm discussed in Section III. The setting we consider is the 
resource control problem in hierarchical small-cell networks, more generally known as heterogeneous networks 
(HetNets) [27]. HetNets are wireless deployments where small cells (e.g., femto-cells) with lower signal power are 
positioned within the coverage area of a macro-cell primarily to multiply the capacity of this area. Traffic steering and 
load balancing are key aspects of HetNets as femto-cells can be installed in hotspots to offload much of the traffic from 
the macro layer. As envisioned in [28], HetNets will be integral to wireless deployments in near future. However, the 
coexistence of macro and small cell elements is not without ramifications. As argued in [28], HetNet topologies call 
for a new approach to run networks that is more complex, that requires a higher level of automation and more 
sophisticated resource control. Our examples in II.C.1 and II.C.2 entail uplink and downlink HetNet communication 
scenarios, respectively.   
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 1.  Example constrained stochastic game setup: Decentralized resource control in two-tier small-cell networks. (a) uplink. (b) downlink. 
1) Spectrum Access Control in Uplink Communications 
Consider a two-tier CDMA femto-cell network (see Fig. 1(a)). It is assumed that the system consists of a single 
macro-cell base-station (MBS) receiving data from macro-user equipments (MUEs) in a region. Within this region, 
there are also 𝐾 co-channel femto-cells deployed by home or office users on the same frequency band (with bandwidth 
𝑊) as the macro-cell. In each femto-cell, there is one femto base-station (FBS) receiving data from a number of femto 
user equipments (FUEs). For simplicity, only one active FUE is assumed in each cell. Let ℎ𝑘?́?
𝑢  denote the gain of the 
link between FUE 𝑘 and FBS ?́?. Also, 𝑁𝑜 denotes the noise power on all channels. Each FUE seeks to maximize its 
own transmission rate which, by Shannon-Hartley’s theorem (e.g., see [29]), depends on its received signal-to-
interference plus noise ratio (SINR). We assume each FUE only gets to decide how aggressively (high/low in terms of 
power) it should transmit its signal; i.e., 𝑎𝑘
𝑢,𝑛 ∈ 𝐴𝑘 = {𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ}. Due to the shared nature of the wireless channel, 
each FUE’s perceived SINR depends not only on its own action but also on the actions of other FUEs. An FUE 
transmitting at a high power level, though may increase its own SINR, will interfere with the transmissions of the other 
FUEs, prompting them in turn to adopt a more aggressive behavior. Such a situation is undesirable since FUEs usually 
operate on limited batteries which require judicious consumption. In fact, the immediate cost 𝑐𝑘
𝑢,𝑛
 incurred by each 
FUE 𝑘 from choosing action 𝑎𝑘
𝑢,𝑛
 is its consumed power, i.e., 𝑐𝑘
𝑢,𝑛 = 𝑎𝑘
𝑢,𝑛
, with the restriction that the average power 
consumption over time should not exceed a pre-specified constraint ?̅?𝑘
𝑢. Moreover, given the two-tier structure of our 
setup, the activity of the MUEs is yet another source of interference, causing FUEs’ signals to be further attenuated at 
their FBSs. Let 𝑔0𝑘
𝑢  denote the channel gain between MUE and FBS 𝑘. MUE’s interference activity over the shared 
channel is typically modeled as a time-homogenous discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) (e.g., see [30]). We use the 
binary random variable 𝑠𝑛 ∈ 𝒮 = {0,1} to indicate the macro activity at time 𝑛; i.e., 𝑠𝑛 = 1 if the channel is occupied, 
in which case the interference power sensed at 𝑘-th FBS would be: 𝑔0𝑘
𝑢 . 𝑎0, where 𝑎0 denotes the MUE’s transmit 
power, and 𝑔0𝑘
𝑢  denotes the gain of the link between MUE and FBS 𝑘. Also, 𝑠𝑛 = 0, if the channel is idle. Hence, the 
uplink spectrum access control problem gives rise to a setting which is both strategic and stochastic. It is strategic since 
the FUEs’ objectives are coupled due to mutual interference, and it is stochastic because FUEs’ decisions have to be 
made under the effect of MUEs’ Markovian dynamics. In this scenario, the utility 𝑢𝑘
𝑢,𝑛
 accrued by each FUE 𝑘 at time 
10 
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𝑛 is its instantaneous Shannon rate: 
𝑢𝑘
𝑢,𝑛 = 𝑢𝑘
𝑢(𝑠𝑛, 𝑎𝑘
𝑢,𝑛 , 𝒂−𝑘
𝑢,𝑛) = 𝑊. log2 [1 +
𝑎𝑘
𝑢,𝑛. ℎ𝑘𝑘
𝑢
𝑁𝑜 + 𝕀{𝑠𝑛}. 𝑔0𝑘
𝑢 . 𝑎0
𝑢 + ∑ 𝑎
?́?
𝑢,𝑛. ℎ?́?𝑘
𝑢
?́?∈𝒦,?́?≠𝑘
]. (13) 
Each FUE seeks a policy which maximizes its long-run rate utility subject to its power constraint. At the collective, 
social-level, it is desired to coordinate FUEs’ decisions by striking a CE-based consensus. Our algorithm in III.B.3 
allows FUEs to reach this consensus based only on their instantaneous rate and power consumption as feedbacks.  
2) Power Control in Downlink Communications 
In the same topology, consider the reverse scenario of downlink transmissions from MBS to its MUE and from FBSs 
down to their associated FUEs (Fig. 1(b)). We assume that MBS transmits at a constant power 𝑎0
𝑑, while each FBS 
chooses its power 𝑎𝑘
𝑑,𝑛
 from a finite set of power levels. Let ℎ𝑘?́?
𝑑  denote the gain of the link between FBS 𝑘 and FUE 
?́?; likewise, {𝑔0𝑘
𝑑 }
𝑘∈𝒦
 (resp. {𝑔𝑘0
𝑑 }
𝑘∈𝒦
) denotes MBS-FUE (resp., FBS-MUE) channel gains. Consistent with the 
common characterization of femto entities as best effort users, the traffic in FBS is assumed to be backlogged, while it 
is bursty and stochastic in MBS. Let 𝒜𝑛 be the random number of packets arrived in the 𝑛-th timeslot to MBS’s buffer 
whose capacity is capped by 𝑁𝐵 packets. The process {𝒜
𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ is assumed to be i.i.d. with general distribution ℙ{𝒜} 
and mean 𝜆 = 𝔼[𝒜]. By Shannon’s law, MBS’s achievable bit rate is given by (14) below: 
𝑟0
𝑛 = 𝑊. log2 [1 +
𝑎0
𝑑 . 𝑔00
𝑑
𝑁𝑜 + ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑑,𝑛. 𝑔𝑘0
𝑑
𝑘∈𝒦
]. (14) 
Accordingly, the evolution of the system state (i.e., the buffer length in MBS) can be described by (15): 
𝑏0
𝑛+1 = min((𝑏0
𝑛 −
𝜏. 𝑟0
𝑛
𝐿
)
+
+𝒜𝑛, 𝑁𝐵), (15) 
where, 𝜏 denotes the timeslot duration, 𝐿 is the packet length in bits, and (. )+ stands for max(. ,0). In this game, FBS 
agents are interested in maximizing their expected physical throughput (16) with the restriction that their interference 
to the macro layer be low enough so that the expected length of MBS’s buffer remains below a certain threshold ?̅?0:  
𝑢𝑘
𝑑,𝑛 = 𝑢𝑘
𝑑(𝑠𝑛, 𝑎𝑘
𝑑,𝑛, 𝒂−𝑘
𝑑,𝑛) = 𝑊. log2 [1 +
𝑎𝑘
𝑑,𝑛. ℎ𝑘𝑘
𝑑
𝑁𝑜 + 𝑔0𝑘
𝑑 . 𝑎0
𝑑 + ∑ 𝑎
?́?
𝑑,𝑛. ℎ?́?𝑘
𝑑
?́?∈𝒦,?́?≠𝑘
], (16) 
Again, it is desired that FBSs learn a stationary CE behavior by only receiving instantaneous feedbacks on their own 
rate 𝑢𝑘
𝑑,𝑛
 and on MBS’s buffer occupancy state 𝑏0
𝑛. 
III. LEARNING STATIONARY CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA 
As with the case of MDPs, the fundamental update procedure for learning a policy can be derived from 
operationalizing Bellman equations in (10) and (11). For now, consider an unconstrained game, and imagine a 
centralized entity iteratively running the update equations below, for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, and for all 𝒂 ∈ 𝑨(𝑠): 
?̂?𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1∶= ∑ ?̂?𝑠
𝑛(𝒂)?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛
𝒂∈𝑨(𝑠)
, (17) 
?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛+1 ∶= (1 − 𝛾).𝑢𝑘(𝑠, 𝒂) + 𝛾.∑𝒫𝑠𝒂?́?
?́?∈𝒮
?̂?𝑘,?́?
𝑛+1, (18) 
?̂?𝑠
𝑛+1 ∈ Π𝑐𝑒 ({?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,.)
𝑛+1 }
𝑘∈𝒦
). (19) 
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where, Π𝑐𝑒 returns the set of all policies satisfying Definition 1. The first step to make this procedure more practical is 
to do without assuming that the matrix 𝒫 of transition probabilities is known a priori. This is of particular interest in 
applications where the statistical knowledge regarding the processes underlying the system evolution is not available 
beforehand. In the context of our example from II.C, this corresponds to FUEs having to reach a consensus with no 
knowledge of the MUE’s stochastic occupancy behavior, or FBSs adjusting their power levels without knowing the 
statistics of the packet arrival process in MBS (e.g., 𝜆). The standard way to tackle the case of unknown 𝒫 is to adopt 
an asynchronous variant of (18) with a decaying step size, better known as Q-learning. With this modification, the 
learning task would proceed by simulating a joint action, actually observing the next state, and run (18) for one state-
action pair per learning iteration (see Table I for a procedure of this spirit). 
The second step towards practice is decentralization so that each agent runs its local version of the above procedure. 
A naive decentralization, however, is subject to possible mis-coordination in the equilibrium selection step in (19). We 
discuss the known remedies for this issue as we review the existing CE learning algorithms in the sequel. Another issue 
has to do with the extent of knowledge an agent is assumed to have about its opponents. In fact, one can distinguish 
between coupled and uncoupled equilibrium learning procedures. In coupled learning, each agent needs to know the 
utilities of its opponents (e.g., the channel gains in (13) and (16)); uncoupled learning, however, is more practical since 
it can proceed without that luxury.  
In this section, we first review the existing ideas for learning stationary CE. We begin by the coupled algorithm of 
CE-Q [20], and highlight its shortcomings. Then, we turn to uncoupled QnR learning [21], which prepares the ground 
for presentation of our CNRQ algorithm, a provably convergent, constrained, and single-loop re-cast of QnR.  
A. Existing Procedures for Learning Stationary CE in Stochastic Games 
CE-Q [20] and QnR [20][21] are the only algorithms we know of that address the problem of learning stationary CE. 
At each iteration, both CE-Q and QnR use Q-learning to update the Q-values based on the estimated CE policy for the 
next state. However, when it comes to update the CE policy itself, CE-Q and QnR differ significantly. In what follows, 
we briefly discuss the idea utilized in each algorithm for estimating CE and highlight their shortcomings. 
1) CE-Q Learning 
Much in the same way as the basic update rules in (17), (18), and (19), in CE-Q [20], the estimate for the CE policy 
is obtained by solving the system of linear inequalities corresponding to the definition of CE  (step 5 in Table I). 
Therefore, each agent 𝑘 is assumed to observe the rewards of all others and to maintain a model of their Q tables. This 
requirement makes CE-Q a coupled learning procedure. For ease of reference, we call this version of CE-Q as semi-
distributed. Also, as argued in [20], in the presence of multiple equilibria, semi-distributed CE-Q is subject to mis-
coordination in the equilibrium selection step. This problem has been alleviated in [20] by introducing some 
equilibrium selection mechanisms. For instance, a utilitarian selector chooses an equilibrium which maximizes the 
sum of all agents’ Q-values; however, except in very special games (e.g., zero-sum), CE-Q in general needs that the 
play be centralized. We refer to this version of CE-Q as centralized CE-Q learning. 
2) QnR Learning 
The QnR algorithm in [21] eliminates the need for calls to an equilibrium solver. Instead, each agent relies on a no-
12 
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regret learning algorithm to independently generate its own policy. Agents play according to their own policies, and 
compute their respective value functions based on the joint empirical distribution of play. This approach is theoretically 
sound since in the context of normal-form games, no-regret algorithms converge in empirical frequency to CE [16]. 
As we also rely on a no-regret procedure for our algorithm in III.B, we first give a brief account on the idea of no-
regret learning, and then present QnR’s pseudo-code in Table II.   
Consider a normal form game with payoff functions (𝑟𝑘(. ))𝑘∈𝒦. In no-regret learning [16], the agents reinforce the 
actions they regret not having played enough in the past. In particular, each agent 𝑘 has an implicit regret matrix 𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉 
which maintains, for every pair of actions 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑘, the difference in average payoff if 𝑘 had taken action 𝑗 in the past 
every time it took action 𝑖; i.e.,  
𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉
𝑛 =
1
𝑛
∑[𝑟𝑘(𝑗, 𝒂−𝑘
𝜏 ) − 𝑟𝑘(𝑖, 𝒂−𝑘
𝜏 )]. 𝕀{𝑎𝑘
𝜏=𝑖}
𝑛
𝜏=1
. (20) 
In (𝑛 + 1)st round, given 𝑎𝑘
𝑛 = 𝑖, agent 𝑘 transitions to action 𝑎𝑘
𝑛+1 = 𝑗 with a probability 𝑇𝑘
𝑛+1(𝑎𝑘
𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑎𝑘
𝑛 = 𝑖) 
proportional to 𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉
𝑛 , and sticks to 𝑖 with 1 − ∑ 𝑇𝑘
𝑛+1(𝑎𝑘
𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑎𝑘
𝑛 = 𝑖)𝑗∈𝐴𝑘,𝑗≠𝑖 . In fact, the play probabilities 𝑝𝑘
𝑛+1 
for the next stage (𝑛 + 1) are obtained by solving the following balance equations: 
𝑝𝑘
𝑛+1(𝑖)∑𝑇𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉
𝑛+1
𝑗≠𝑖
=∑𝑝𝑘
𝑛+1(𝑗). 𝑇𝑘,〈𝑗,𝑖〉
𝑛+1 .
𝑗≠𝑖
 (21) 
The learning proceeds by exploring choices and transitioning to actions which are conceived better according to the 
regret measure. Naturally, an agent’s objective is to select a sequence of actions which guarantees to it no regret in the 
long run, no matter what the other agents do. Let 𝑧𝑛(𝒂) be the number of times the joint action profile 𝒂 is actually 
played in the first 𝑛 periods, divided by 𝑛. In fact, 𝑧𝑛(𝒂) denotes the empirical distribution of play and is a probability 
distribution over 𝑨. The no-regret learning of [16] has the property that when all agents’ regret matrices approach to 
the non-positive orthant ℝ−
|𝐴𝑘×𝐴𝑘|, 𝑧𝑛 converges to the set of CE. 
Now, in QnR [21], in order to utilize the idea of no-regret learning in the context of stochastic games, each agent 𝑘 
runs two nested control loops: Q-learning as the outer loop and multiple copies of the no-regret algorithm (one per 
state) as the inner loop (see Table II). At each outer loop iteration, the 𝑠-th copy of the no-regret algorithm of the inner 
loop starts afresh, fed by the current estimate of Q-values as 𝑘’s payoff function. The inner loop iterates until the 
agent’s regret matrix 𝑅𝑘,𝑠
𝑚  converges to the non-positive orthant. Upon convergence of the inner loop, the outer loop 
begins its next iteration knowing that the joint empirical frequency of play for state 𝑠 will correspond to a CE of the 
game in 𝑠. QnR learning goes on until all Q-table entries converge. 
𝑄nR’s advantage is that it works without requiring an equilibrium solver, and that the agents need not know their 
opponents’ rewards to update their play probabilities. Hence, 𝑄nR falls into the category of boundedly rational 
uncoupled learning dynamics [18][19]. 𝑄nR’s main disadvantage, however, is its nested loop structure. This not only 
makes it difficult to conduct a theoretical convergence analysis, but has some practical implications too: First, the 
virtual play in the inner loop, apart from being an interlude in the actual game, would require that the agents agree on 
a second iteration index during the learning process. The other limitation has to do with the extension of this paradigm 
to handle constrained problems, which leads to a third control loop and even more complications. 
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TABLE I 
SKETCH OF THE CE-Q ALGORITHM [20] 
Loop: 
1. Execute action 𝑎𝑘 in state 𝑠; 
2. Observe joint agents’ play 𝒂−𝑘; 
3. Observe own instantaneous reward 𝑟𝑘(𝑠, 𝑎𝑘 , 𝒂−𝑘) as well as 
    the reward 𝑟?́?(. ) for each agent ?́? ∈ 𝒦\{𝑘}; 
4. Observe next state ?́?; 
5. Choose a CE policy 𝝅?́?
𝐶𝐸 ∈ Π𝑐𝑒 ({?̂?𝑘,(?́?,.)}𝑘∈𝒦
) via  
    solving the system of linear inequalities associated with CE; 
6. for each agent 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 do 
6.1. Update estimate for the value of the next state: 
?̂?𝑘,?́? ∶= ∑𝝅?́?
𝐶𝐸(𝒃)?̂?𝑘,(?́?,𝒃)
𝑛
𝒃∈𝑨
; 
6.2. Update estimate for Q-value of current state-action pair: 
?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂) ∶= ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂) + 𝛼[(1 − 𝜌) 𝑟𝑘(𝑠, 𝒂) + 𝜌?̂?𝑘,?́? − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)]; 
7. Choose action ?́?𝑘 (off-policy) and set 𝑎𝑘 ∶= ?́?𝑘; 
8. Update 𝑠 ∶= ?́?; Go to 1;  
 
TABLE II 
SKETCH OF THE QNR ALGORITHM [21] 
Outer Loop  (on-policy Q-learning): 
1. Execute action 𝑎𝑘 and observe joint agents’ play 𝒂−𝑘; 
2. Update joint empirical frequency of play ?̂?𝑠(𝒂); 
3. Observe instantaneous reward 𝑟𝑘(𝑠, 𝑎𝑘 , 𝒂−𝑘) and next state ?́?; 
4. Update estimate for the value of the next state: 
?̂?𝑘,?́? ∶= ∑ ?̂??́?(𝒂). ?̂?𝑘,(?́?,𝒂);
𝒂∈𝑨
 
?̂?𝑘(𝑠, 𝑎𝑘) ∶= (1 − 𝜌)𝑟𝑘(𝑠, 𝒂) + 𝜌?̂?𝑘,?́?; 
5. Update estimate for Q-value of current state-action pair: 
?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂) ∶= ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂) + 𝛼[?̂?𝑘(𝑠, 𝑎𝑘) − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)]; 
6. Inner Loop (no-regret learning): 
for 𝑚 = 0,1,2, … ,𝑀 − 1 do 
6.1. Use (20) to update regret matrix 𝑅𝑘,〈.,.〉,𝑠
𝑚+1  for state 𝑠 with 
        ?̂?𝑘(𝑠, . ) as payoffs; 
6.2. Update the action transition probability matrix 𝑇𝑘,𝑠
𝑚+1;  
6.3. Use (21) to compute play probabilities 𝑝𝑘,𝑠
𝑚+1; 
6.4. Update average distribution of play: 
?̅?𝑘,𝑠
𝑚+1 ∶=
1
𝑚 + 1
∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑠
𝜏 ;
𝑚+1
𝜏=1
 
7. Choose ?́?𝑘 by an 𝜀-soft version of ?̅?𝑘,?́?
𝑀 (?́?𝑘), and set 𝑎𝑘 ∶= ?́?𝑘;  
8. Update 𝑠 ∶= ?́?; Go to 1; 
 
B. Proposed Algorithm 
In this section, we present a stochastic approximation-based re-expression of QnR which handles constrained games 
and, more importantly, is amenable to convergence analysis. As discussed in III.A.2, QnR relies on the joint operation 
of no-regret and Q-learning working together in a nested loop configuration. Since both of these algorithms can be 
expressed in the form of a typical stochastic approximation [22][31],[32], we first very briefly remark on some general 
forms of stochastic approximation algorithms in III.B.1, and then highlight the connection of no-regret- and Q-leanring 
with relevant notions from the theory of stochastic approximation in III.B.2. Finally, in III.B.3, we give our version of 
things, referred to as CNRQ-learning. 
1) Some General Forms of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms 
Let 𝒥 = {1,… , |𝒥|}. A general stochastic recursive process has the following structure [32]: 
𝑥𝑛+1 − 𝑥𝑛 = 𝜅(𝑛)𝑓(𝑥𝑛, 𝜗𝑛), (22) 
where, 𝑥𝑛 ∈ ℝ|𝒥|, 𝑓(𝑥𝑛, 𝜗𝑛):ℝ|𝒥| × ℝ|𝒥| → ℝ|𝒥|, 𝜗𝑛 ∈ ℝ
|𝒥| is a random noise, and {𝜅(𝑛)}𝑛∈ℕ is a sequence of small, 
usually decreasing step-sizes. It is common to capture the noise effect as an additive term, by introducing: 𝐹(𝑥𝑛) =
𝔼𝜗[𝑓(𝑥
𝑛, 𝜗𝑛)], and 𝒱𝑛+1 =  𝑓(𝑥𝑛, 𝜗𝑛) − 𝔼𝜗[𝑓(𝑥
𝑛, 𝜗𝑛)], where, 𝐹(𝑥𝑛) is referred to as the mean field, and {𝒱𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ 
is, by construction, a martingale difference sequence. In cases where the mean-field 𝐹 is a set-valued map 
(correspondence), we refer to the iteration above as a stochastic approximation with set-valued update increments or 
more concisely as a stochastic recursive inclusion [31]; i.e., 
𝑥𝑛+1 − 𝑥𝑛 ∈ 𝜅(𝑛)[𝐹(𝑥𝑛) + 𝒱𝑛+1]. 
Finally, let 2𝒥 be the power set of 𝒥. If we denote by 𝐽?̅? ∈ 2𝒥 the components of the iterates {𝑥𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ updated at 
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iteration 𝑛, we may use a counter 𝜒𝑛(𝑗) = ∑ 𝕀{𝑗∈𝐽?̅?}
𝑛
𝑖=1  to record how many times each component of  {𝑥
𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ have 
been updated until 𝑛. The following process, then, is called an asynchronous stochastic approximation [31] since it is 
no longer the case that all components of 𝑥𝑛 get updated simultaneously at time 𝑛: 
𝑥𝑗
𝑛+1 − 𝑥𝑗
𝑛 = 𝜅(𝜒𝑛(𝑗)). 𝕀{𝑗∈𝐽?̅?}[𝐹𝑗(𝑥
𝑛) + 𝒱𝑗
𝑛+1], 
2) Q-Learning and No-Regret Learning as Stochastic Approximations 
Fix 𝝅 ∈ Π as a stationary randomized policy over the joint action space 𝑨. The function 𝑄𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂) ≝
(1 − 𝜌). 𝔼[r𝑘(𝑠, 𝒂)] + 𝜌∑ 𝒫𝑠𝒂?́??́?∈𝒮 𝑉𝑘,?́?(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) is the expected long-term value of taking action 𝒂 in state 𝑠, and 
following 𝝅 thereafter. To learn this value without having to know about 𝒫, one can use the Q-learning algorithm [11]. 
Due to [22], the exact form of the Q-learning update equation (e.g., step 5 in Table II) is as below: 
?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛+1 − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 ∶= 𝜅(𝜒𝑛(𝑠, 𝒂)). 𝕀{(𝑠,𝒂)=(𝑠𝑛,𝒂𝑛)}. [𝐹(𝑠,𝒂)(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅) + 𝒱𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛+1 ], (23) 
with mean-field 𝐹(𝑠,𝒂)(?̂?𝑘
𝑛) = 𝑄𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂) − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 , noise 𝒱(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛+1 = (1 − 𝜌). 𝑟𝑘(𝑠, 𝒂) + 𝜌. 𝑉𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝑛 − 𝑄𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂), and 𝑉𝑘,𝑠
𝑛 =
∑ 𝜋𝑠(𝒂)𝒂 . ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 . Of particular note in is the use of asynchronous counters 𝜒𝑛(𝑠, 𝒂) ≝ ∑ 𝕀{(𝑠𝑖,𝒂𝑖)=(𝑠,𝒂)}.
𝑛
𝑖=1  Such 
counters are needed as the time to visit each (𝑠, 𝒂) is random, and we might not have complete control over which 
component is to be updated next. Hence, by structure, Q-learning is an asynchronous stochastic approximation. 
As for no-regret learning, it is noted in [17] that (20) can be cast as a moving average with step size 𝜅(𝑛) = 1/𝑛: 
𝑅𝑘
𝑛+1 − 𝑅𝑘
𝑛 = 𝜅(𝑛). ([𝑟𝑘(𝑗, 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 ) − 𝑟𝑘(𝑖, 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 )]. 𝕀{𝑎𝑘
𝑛=𝑖} − 𝑅𝑘
𝑛), (24) 
Also, it has been shown in [17][17] that the above equation has the following correspondence 𝐹(𝑅𝑘
𝑛) as its mean field: 
𝐹(𝑅𝑘
𝑛) = 𝐶𝑘(𝑝𝑘
𝑛 × ∆(𝑨−𝑘)) − 𝑅𝑘
𝑛, (25) 
where, for 𝑥 ∈ ∆(𝑨), 𝐶𝑘(𝑥) is a |𝐴𝑘| × |𝐴𝑘| matrix with entries: 
𝐶𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉(𝑥) ≝ ∑ 𝑥(𝒂). [𝑟𝑘(𝑗, 𝒂−𝑘) − 𝑟𝑘(𝑖, 𝒂−𝑘)].
𝒂∈𝑨:𝑎𝑘=𝑖
 (26) 
Hence, the regret update procedure can be re-written as a stochastic recursive inclusion of the form: 
𝑅𝑘
𝑛+1 − 𝑅𝑘
𝑛 ∈ 𝜅(𝑛). (𝐹(𝑅𝑘
𝑛) + 𝒱𝑘
𝑛+1), (27) 
where, the random noise term 𝒱𝑘
𝑛+1 is as below: 
𝒱𝑘
𝑛+1 ∈ [𝑟𝑘
𝑛(𝑗, 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 ) − 𝑟𝑘
𝑛(𝑖, 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 )]. 𝕀{𝑎𝑘
𝑛=𝑖} − 𝐶𝑘(𝑝𝑘
𝑛 × ∆(𝑨−𝑘)). (28) 
3) CNRQ Learning 
In III.B.2, we remarked on the fact that both no-regret- and Q-learning are, by structure, special cases of stochastic 
approximation algorithms. In this section, we resort to the multi-timescale extension of standard stochastic 
approximation theory [32] to recast the nested loop structure of the QnR algorithm as a single-loop two-timescale 
stochastic approximation. The idea is to have the Q-learning and no-regret iterations proceed simultaneously with 
different step-size schedules so that Q-table entries get updated on a slower effective timescale compared to the regret-
matrix updates. Multi-timescale arguments of stochastic approximation [32] then guarantee that no-regret iterations 
see Q-learning as quasi-static while the latter sees the former as nearly equilibrated, thus mimicking the QnR’s nested 
loop configuration. Following the same methodology, we introduce an even slower third timescale for updating the 
Lagrange multipliers associated with the game’s constraints. More specifically, we leverage on Theorem I and the 
saddle point property in (7) to cast the algorithm as a primal-dual scheme; i.e., given a fixed 𝜆𝑘 for each agent 𝑘, 
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‘primal’ maximization reduces to computing, in a distributed fashion, a CE behavior 𝝅𝑐𝑒 (c.f., Definition 1) of the 
stochastic game Γ𝝀. Also, given that 𝒢𝑘(𝜆𝑘) = ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 , 𝝅𝑐𝑒), the correct multiplier 𝜆𝑘
∗  can be learned by stochastic 
gradient descent in the ‘dual’ space, performed on the slowest timescale, so that it sees the ‘primal’ maximization as 
having essentially equilibrated. We refer to the overall algorithm as CNRQ-learning. Given the set-valued update 
increments of no-regret learning and the asynchronous nature of the Q-learning iterations, CNRQ would essentially 
correspond to a three-timescale asynchronous stochastic recursive inclusion. We save the formalization of these ideas 
for Section IV, where we give a detailed convergence analysis. Here, we mainly establish notation and discuss the 
algorithm’s workflow. Let the learning rates {𝛼(𝑛)}𝑛∈ℕ, {𝛽(𝑛)}𝑛∈ℕ, and {𝛾(𝑛)}𝑛∈ℕ satisfy (A1) below: 
∑𝛼(𝑛) =∑𝛽(𝑛) =
𝑛
∑𝛾(𝑛) =
𝑛
∞.
𝑛
 
∑(𝛼(𝑛)2 + 𝛽(𝑛)2 + 𝛾(𝑛)2) < ∞.
𝑛
 
𝛼(𝑛)
𝛾(𝑛)
,
𝛽(𝑛)
𝛼(𝑛)
→ 0   𝑎𝑠  𝑛 → ∞. 
       (A1) 
Also, for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 and ∀𝒂 ∈ 𝑨, let 𝜙𝑛(𝑠) and 𝜐𝑛(𝑠, 𝒂) be two asynchronous counters: 𝜙𝑛(𝑠) ∶= ∑ 𝕀{𝑠𝑖=𝑠}
𝑛
𝑖=1  and 
𝜐𝑛(𝑠, 𝒂) ∶= ∑ 𝕀{(𝑠𝑖,𝒂𝑖)=(𝑠,𝒂)}.
𝑛
𝑖=1  We organize the CNRQ’s workflow into 9 steps, as listed in Table III: 
 In step 0, each agent initializes the empirical frequency of joint play 𝝅𝑠
0(. ), Lagrange multiplier  𝜆𝑘
0 , Q-table ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,.)
0 , 
and state-dependent regret matrix 𝑅𝑘,〈.,.〉,𝑠
0 . It then samples its action 𝑎𝑘
0 from a uniform distribution.  
 In step 1, according to the observed joint opponents’ play 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 , agent 𝑘 updates the empirical distribution 𝝅𝑠
𝑛(. ) on 
the fastest timescale. It would be convenient to express 𝝅𝑠
𝑛(. ) in closed-form as below: 
𝝅𝑠
𝑛(𝒂) = ∑𝛾(𝜙𝜂−1(𝑠))
𝜂≤𝑛
[∏(1 − 𝛾 (𝜙𝜁(𝑠)))
𝑛−1
𝜁=𝜂
] 𝑒𝒂𝜂 . (29) 
 In step 2, agent 𝑘 calculates its instantaneous Lagrangian ℓ𝑘( 𝜆𝑘
𝑛, 𝑠𝑛, 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 ) for its played action 𝑎𝑘
𝑛, and observes the 
next state of the system 𝑠𝑛+1. 
 Steps 3 and 4 update the Q-table ?̂?𝑘
𝑛 using Q-learning on the moderate timescale. This step unfolds as follows: agent 
𝑘 first computes its Lagrangian value function ℒ
𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝜆𝑘  for the next state 𝑠𝑛+1 based on the empirical frequency of 
play 𝝅𝑛+1 and current estimate ?̂?𝑘
𝑛. It then updates its Q-table using both its instantaneous Lagrangian  ℓ𝑘 and its 
long-term Lagrangian ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘. 
 In step 5, Lagrange multiplier 𝜆𝑘
𝑛 is updated based on the perceived cost 𝑐𝑘(𝑠
𝑛, 𝒂𝑛) and using stochastic (sub-
)gradient descent on the slowest timescale. 
 Step 6 is devoted to the state-dependent regret matrix update. The regret matrix 𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛  is conditional on 𝑘’s current 
play 𝑎𝑘
𝑛 = 𝑖, and is calculated as the Q-value differential between 𝑖 and every alternative action 𝑗. Similarly to step 
1, this update equation runs on the fastest timescale. To make more explicit the dependency of 𝑅𝑘
𝑛 on both ?̂?𝑘
𝑛 and 
𝝅𝑛, one may use (29) to re-write 𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛  for ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑘 as follows: 
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𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛 = ∑ 𝛾(𝜙𝜂−1(𝑠))
𝜂≤𝑛:𝑎𝑘
𝜂
=𝑖
[∏(1 − 𝛾 (𝜙𝜁(𝑠)))
𝑛−1
𝜁=𝜂
] . (?̂?
𝑘,(𝑠,𝑗,𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 )
𝜂
− ?̂?
𝑘,(𝑠,𝑖,𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 )
𝜂
)  
= ∑ 𝝅𝑠
𝑛(𝒂). (?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝑗,𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 )
𝑛 − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝑖,𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 )
𝑛 ) .
𝒂∈𝑨:𝑎𝑘=𝑖
 
(30) 
 Step 7 uses the updated regret-values to compute the action transition probabilities 𝑇𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1(𝑎𝑘
𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑎𝑘
𝑛 = 𝑖) from 
the current action 𝑖 to every alternative action 𝑗. 𝑇𝑘
𝑛+1 is proportional to the positive part of the regret measure; i.e., 
max (𝑅𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1, 0). However, to ensure the smoothness of these transitions, we use a function Υ(. ) as a smooth version 
of max (. ,0), defined as:  Υ(𝑥) ≜ {
𝑥, 𝑥 > 0
0, 𝑥 < 0
 for any 𝛿 > 0 and 𝑥 ∉ 𝛿 − 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑(0). 
 Finally, in step 8, the action for the next stage (𝑛 + 1) is sampled from 𝑝𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝑛+1  which is an 𝜀-soft version of the 
regret-based strategy ?̂?𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝑛+1  with 𝜀 being the exploration factor. ?̂?𝑘
𝑛+1 is an invariant measure for the stochastic 
transition matrix 𝑇𝑘
𝑛+1. Therefore, 𝑝𝑘
𝑛+1 can be viewed as the invariant measure for the 𝜀-trembled version of 𝑇𝑘
𝑛+1 
denoted by ?̃?𝑘
𝑛+1, and can be obtained by solving the following balance equations for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑘: 
𝑝𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1(𝑎) ∑ ?̃?𝑘,〈𝑎,?́?〉,𝑠
𝑛+1
?́?∈𝐴𝑘−{𝑎}
= ∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1(?́?). ?̃?𝑘,〈?́?,𝑎〉,𝑠
𝑛+1
?́?∈𝐴𝑘−{𝑎}
, (31) 
where, ?̃?𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛+1 ∶= (1 − 𝜀)
Υ(𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛+1 )
𝜇
+
𝜀
|𝐴𝑘|
 ,     ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑘 . 
(32) 
TABLE III 
CONSTRAINED NO-REGRET Q-LEARNING (CNRQ-LEARNING) 
0) Initialization: for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, set:  𝝅𝑠
0(. ) = 0; ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,.)
0 = 0;  𝜆𝑘
0 = 0; 𝑅𝑘,〈.,.〉,𝑠
0 = 0;  𝑎𝑘
0~
1
|𝐴𝑘|
; 
for 𝑛 = 0,1,2, … repeat the following steps: 
1) Observe the joint opponents’ play 𝒂−𝑘
𝑛  and update the empirical frequency of ∀𝒂 ∈ 𝑨 for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮: 
𝝅𝑠
𝑛+1(𝒂) ∶= 𝝅𝑠
𝑛(𝒂) + 𝛾(𝜙𝑛(𝑠)). 𝕀{𝑠=𝑠𝑛}. (𝑒𝒂𝑛 − 𝝅𝑠
𝑛(𝒂)); // 𝑒𝒂 is the unit vector in ∆(𝑨) w.r.t. 𝒂 ∈ 𝑨 
2) Observe utility 𝑢𝑘(𝑠
𝑛, 𝒂𝑛), cost 𝑐𝑘(𝑠
𝑛 , 𝒂𝑛), calculate Lagrangian ℓ𝑘(𝜆𝑘
𝑛 , 𝑠𝑛 , 𝒂𝑛), observe next state 𝑠𝑛+1. 
3) Calculate the long-term Lagrangian: ℒ
𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝜆𝑘 ∶= ∑ 𝝅𝑠𝑛+1
𝑛+1 (?́?). ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠𝑛+1,?́?)
𝑛
?́?∈𝒜 ; 
4) Update the Lagrangian Q-table for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, ∀𝒂 ∈ 𝑨 using Q-learning:  
?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛+1 ∶= ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 + 𝛼(𝜐𝑛(𝑠, 𝒂)). 𝕀{(𝑠,𝒂)=(𝑠𝑛,𝒂𝑛)}. [(1 − 𝜌). ℓ𝑘(𝜆𝑘
𝑛 , 𝑠, 𝒂) + 𝜌. ℒ
𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝜆𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 ] ; 
5) Update Lagrange multiplier using stochastic (sub-)gradient descent: 
𝜆𝑘
𝑛+1 ∶= [𝜆𝑘
𝑛 + 𝛽(𝑛). (𝑐𝑘(𝑠
𝑛 , 𝒂𝑛) − ?̅?𝑘)]
+;    // [. ]+ denotes projection onto [0,𝑀𝐴𝑋]. 
6) Update the |𝐴𝑘| × |𝐴𝑘| state-dependent regret matrix 𝑅𝑘
𝑛 for ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑘 and ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮: 
𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛+1 ∶= 𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛 + 𝛾(𝜙𝑛(𝑠)). 𝕀{𝑠=𝑠𝑛}. [(?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝑗,𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 )
𝑛+1 − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝑖,𝒂−𝑘
𝑛 )
𝑛+1 ) . 𝕀{𝑎𝑘
𝑛=𝑖} − 𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛 ] ; 
7) Update the action transition probability for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 and ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑘: 
𝑇𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1(𝑎𝑘
𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑎𝑘
𝑛 = 𝑖) ∶=
{
 
 
 
 
Υ(𝑅𝑘,〈𝑖,𝑗〉,𝑠
𝑛+1 )
𝜇
,                                                      𝑗 ≠ 𝑖
1 − ∑ 𝑇𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1(𝑎𝑘
𝑛+1 = 𝑙|𝑎𝑘
𝑛 = 𝑖)
𝑙∈𝐴𝑘,𝑙≠𝑗
, 𝑗 = 𝑖
; 
where, 𝜇 is the inertia constant and is large enough to ensure that  𝑇𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1(𝑎𝑘
𝑛+1 = 𝑖|𝑎𝑘
𝑛 = 𝑖) > 0 for ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑘. 
8) Action selection: Choose action 𝑎𝑘
𝑛+1 in state 𝑠𝑛+1 according to the following distribution: 
𝑝𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝑛+1 ∶= (1 − 𝜀). ?̂?𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝑛+1 +
𝜀
|𝐴𝑘|
. 𝟏|𝐴𝑘|, 
where, ?̂?𝑘
𝑛+1 is an invariant measure for 𝑇𝑘
𝑛+1, 𝟏|𝐴𝑘| is a |𝐴𝑘| × 1 vector of 1’s, and 0 < 𝜀 ≪ 1 is a small tremble. 
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IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS 
CNRQ-learning is essentially a three-timescale asynchronous stochastic recursive inclusion. To establish CNRQ’s 
convergence, we exploit the recent results by Perkins and Leslie [25] which facilitate the asymptotic analysis in cases 
such as ours where the update patterns involved are both asynchronous and set-valued. The proof framework we use 
is called asynchronous stochastic approximation with differential inclusions. The results given in [25] already account 
for two-timescale setups as well. Also, since in general, the ideas underlying the multi-timescale arguments carry over 
when the number of timescales is more than two [32], using the two-timescale analysis in [25], we first analyze the 
coupled recursions of no-regret- and Q-learning by freezing 𝜆𝑘
𝑛 ≈ 𝜆𝑘; in fact, CNRQ’s iterates can be interpreted as a 
primal-dual scheme, with (?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) getting updated by primal iterations and 𝜆𝑘
𝑛 by dual iterations. Now, in view of 
𝛽(𝑛) = 𝑜(𝛼(𝑛)), the dual minimization is carried out at a slower timescale so that it sees the primal maximization as 
equilibrated while the latter sees the former as quasi-static. The analysis of the pair (?̂?𝑘
𝑛 , 𝝅𝑛) can be conducted by 
invoking the results of ([25], Section 4). Once the almost sure convergence of the primal iterates is established, we 
have 𝑑(𝝅𝑛, ∁𝑐𝑒
𝝀 ) → 0, ?̂?𝑘
𝑛 − 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘
𝑛↑∞
→  0, and thus ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) → 𝒢𝑘(𝜆𝑘). Then, using results from constrained 
reinforcement learning (e.g., see [33]), we can prove that the dual iterates 𝜆𝑘
𝑛 also converge to 𝜆𝑘
∗ . We organize our 
convergence analysis into three parts: first, we extract the mean-field and noise components associated with the primal 
iterates (?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) in IV.A. Next, in IV.B, we verify the conditions which should be satisfied by these components so 
that the results in [25] become applicable to our case. Finally, in IV.C, we come up with differential inclusion arguments 
to establish the convergence of CNRQ along the lines of ([25], Section 4). 
A. Identifying the Mean-Field and Noise Components 
According to Table I, the estimates {𝝅𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ and {?̂?𝑘
𝑛}
𝑛∈ℕ
 are given iteratively by the following coupled process: 
?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛+1 − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 = 𝛼(𝜐𝑛(𝑠, 𝒂)). 𝕀{(𝑠,𝒂)=(𝑠𝑛,𝒂𝑛)}. [𝐹(𝑠,𝒂)(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) + 𝑉𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛+1 ], (33) 
𝝅𝑠
𝑛+1 − 𝝅𝑠
𝑛 ∈ 𝛾(𝜙𝑛(𝑠)). 𝕀{𝑠=𝑠𝑛}. [𝐺𝑠(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) + 𝑈𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1], (34) 
where, 
𝐹(𝑠,𝒂)(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) = Η(𝑠,𝒂)
𝜆𝑘 (?̂?𝑘
𝑛 , 𝝅𝑛) − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 , (35) 
𝐺𝑠(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) = Ψ𝑠(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) − 𝝅𝑠
𝑛. (36) 
The mapping Η(𝑠,𝒂)
𝜆𝑘 (. , . ) in (35) is defined for general ?̂?𝑘 ∈ 𝒸
|𝒮×𝑨| and 𝝅 ∈ Π𝝀 as: 
Η(𝑠,𝒂)
𝜆𝑘 (?̂?𝑘, 𝝅) = (1 − 𝜌). 𝔼[ℓ𝑘(𝜆𝑘, 𝑠, 𝒂)] + 𝜌∑𝒫𝑠𝒂?́?
?́?∈𝒮
ℒ𝑘,?́?
𝜆𝑘 (?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅). (37) 
Ψ𝑠 in (36) is a correspondence evaluated at a given (?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) as: 
Ψ𝑠(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) ≜ {𝑝𝑘,𝑠 × ∆(𝑨−𝑘)| 𝑝𝑘,𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑠 (14)}. (38) 
Note that in view of (32) and (30), Ψ𝑠 is dependent on both ?̂?𝑘 and 𝝅. 
To specify the stochastic components {𝑉𝑘
𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ, {𝑈𝑘
𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ, let ?̅? = {((𝑠, 𝒂), 𝑠); 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑎 ∈ 𝑨}, with ?̅?
𝑛 ∈ ?̅? being the 
updated component across ?̅? at iteration 𝑛; also, let 𝑧𝑛 = (?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛). Define ℱ𝑛 as the 𝜎-algebra containing all the 
information up until the end of the 𝑛-th iteration; i.e., ℱ𝑛 ≜ 𝜎({?̅?
𝑚}𝑚, {𝑧
𝑚}𝑚, {𝜐
𝑚(𝑠, 𝒂)}(𝑠,𝒂),𝑚, {𝜙
𝑚(𝑠)}𝑠,𝑚); ∀𝑚 ≤
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𝑛, 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, (𝑠, 𝒂) ∈ 𝒮 × 𝑨. Then, {𝑉𝑘
𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ, {𝑈𝑘
𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ are, by construction, ℱ𝑛-adapted martingale difference processes 
defined on ℝ|𝒮×𝑨| and ℝ|𝒮| resp. as follows: 
𝑉𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛+1 = (1 − 𝜌). ℓ𝑘(𝜆𝑘
𝑛, 𝑠, 𝒂) + 𝜌. ℒ
𝑘,𝑠𝑛+1
𝜆𝑘 −Η(𝑠,𝒂)
𝜆𝑘 (?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛), (39) 
𝑈𝑘,𝑠
𝑛+1 ∈ 𝑒𝒂𝑛 −Ψ𝑠(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛). (40) 
B. Verifying Technical Assumptions 
In this section, we verify the conditions required by [25] on the mean-field and noise components of the (?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) 
iterates. We do this by presenting a sequence of lemmas (I to IV) corresponding resp. to ([25], Assumptions: (B1), 
(B3), (B4), and (B5)). Assumption (B2) in [25] is already satisfied by our assumption (A1) on step-sizes in III.B.3. 
Please refer to Appendix A in the supplementary materials of this paper for proofs of lemmas I to IV. 
Lemma I. For compact sets, 𝐶 ⊂ ℝ|𝒮×𝑨|, 𝐷 ⊂ ℝ|𝒮|, ?̂?𝑘
𝑛 ∈ 𝐶, 𝝅𝑛 ∈ 𝐷 for all 𝑘 and 𝑛. 
Lemma II. It holds that: 
(a) 𝐺(. , . ): 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| × Π𝝀 → Π𝝀 is a Marchaud map [34]; i.e., (i) the graph and domain of 𝐺 are non-empty and 
closed, (ii) the values 𝐺(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) are convex, and (iii) the growth of 𝐺 is linear. 
(b) 𝐹(. , . ): 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| × Π𝝀 → 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| is upper semi-continuous, and for all  𝝅 ∈ Π𝝀, 𝐹(. , 𝝅): 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| → 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| is a 
Marchaud map. 
Lemma III. Consider ℋ𝑛,ℋ𝑛+1 ∈ ?̅?, then: 
(a) ℙ(?̅?𝑛+1 = ℋ𝑛+1| ℱ𝑛) = 𝒬(ℋ𝑛,ℋ𝑛+1)(𝑧), where, 𝒬(ℋ𝑛,ℋ𝑛+1)(𝑧) ∶= ℙ(?̅?𝑛+1 = ℋ𝑛+1| ?̅?𝑛+1 = ℋ𝑛, 𝑧𝑛). 
(b) For all 𝑧 ∈ 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| × Π𝝀, the transition probabilities 𝒬(ℋ𝑛,ℋ𝑛+1)(𝑧) form aperiodic, irreducible Markov chains 
over ?̅? and for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 and (𝑠, 𝒂) ∈ 𝒮 × 𝑨, there exists ℋ,ℋ ∈́ ?̅?, such that 𝑠 ∈ ℋ and (𝑠, 𝒂) ∈ ℋ́. 
(c) The map 𝑧 ⟼ 𝒬(ℋ𝑛,ℋ𝑛+1)(𝑧) is Lipschitz continuous. 
In effect, lemma III verifies that asymptotically every state of the game Γ will be visited a minimum proportion of 
time, say 𝜏 > 0. Also, the 𝜀-trembled action transition probabilities in (32) ensures that every joint action will be 
selected with a non-zero probability; hence, every state-action pair is used a minimum proportion of time, say ?́? > 0. 
Lemma IV. Given any norm ‖. ‖ on ℝ|𝒮×𝑨| and on ℝ|𝒮|, there exists constants Α,Β,C, and D such that: 
𝔼 [(𝑉𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 )
2
| ℱ𝑛] < Α + Β‖?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝒂)
𝑛 ‖
2
,   and  𝔼 [(𝑈𝑘,𝑠
𝑛 )
2
| ℱ𝑛] < C + D‖𝝅𝑠
𝑛‖2  ∀𝑠, 𝒂. 
C. Differential Inclusion Arguments 
In this section, we proceed to characterize the limiting behavior of CNRQ-learning using differential inclusion 
arguments from [25]. Methodologically, the arguments in [25] are based on the well-established ODE approach [31] 
which treats the stochastic approximation (22) as a noisy discretization of an autonomous ODE with 𝐹(𝑥) as its mean-
field. More specifically, under appropriate conditions on the step-sizes, mean-field and noise components of (22), it 
follows that the continuous-time linear interpolation of 𝑥𝑛 asymptotically tracks the stable fixed points of the dynamical 
system ?̇? = 𝐹(𝑥). Hence, the limit sets of (22) will coincide with the set of stable fixed points of its associated ODE, 
and one can study instead the stability of the deterministic system ?̇? = 𝐹(𝑥) to establish the convergence of the random 
sequence {𝑥𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ. The results in [25] extend the ODE method to the case of asynchronous stochastic approximation 
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with set-valued mean-fields. Within this perspective, our next lemma (Lemma V) characterizes the limiting behavior 
of the fast stochastic recursion in (34). Before stating the lemma, we briefly hint on the main theoretical result in [25] 
which considerably facilitates our analysis in this paper. Our overview here is merely to convey the key idea in [25] in 
non-technical terms, and an avid reader is encouraged to consult [25] for a more technical exposition. 
In case we were dealing with a synchronous updating pattern in CNRQ, standard arguments (e.g., [31]) would 
suggest that we may analyze the convergence behavior of the discrete-time iterates {𝝅𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ by studying the limit sets 
of an associated ordinary differential inclusion (ODI) with correspondence 𝐺(. , . ) as its mean field: 
𝑑𝝅𝑡
𝑑𝑡
∈ 𝐺(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅
𝑡), 
where {?̂?𝑘
𝑛}
𝑛∈ℕ
 iterates on the slow timescale are freezed at ?̂?𝑘 by standard multi-timescale results [32]. However, 
unlike synchronous stochastic approximation where the steps sizes 𝛼(𝑛) are deterministic, CNRQ features random and 
time-varying step sizes of the form 𝛾(𝜙𝑛(𝑠)). 𝕀{𝑠=𝑠𝑛}. The conventional approach to dealing with such asynchronicity 
does not immediately extend to set-valued mean fields; also, even if 𝐺(. , . ) were single-valued, the standard procedure 
would be to study the limit sets of a non-autonomous ODE of the form [31]: 
𝑑𝝅𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑀(𝑡). 𝐺(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅
𝑡), (41) 
where, 𝑀(. ) is a matrix-valued measurable process such that 𝑀(𝑡) for each 𝑡 is a diagonal matrix with non-negative 
diagonal entries, reflecting the relative instantaneous rates with which the different components of 𝝅 get updated. The 
existing theory does not explicitly define the scaling matrix 𝑀(. ) and it is further assumed that in the limit all the 
components of 𝝅 are updated in an equally spaced manner and some ‘specific’ minimum proportion of the iterations. 
To work around the difficulties in studying (41), the approach in [25] shows that under the conditions stated in 
Lemma(s) I to IV, the diagonal elements of 𝑀(𝑡) lie almost surely in the closed set [𝜏, 1], for some 𝜏 > 0. It then 
combines the set [𝜏, 1] with the mean field 𝐺(. , . ) to form a set-valued mean-field. More specifically, let Ω|𝒮|
𝜏  be the 
|𝒮| × |𝒮| diagonal matrix of the form: Ω|𝒮|
𝜏 ∶= {diag(𝜉1, … , 𝜉|𝒮|); 𝜉𝑠 ∈ [𝜏, 1], ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮}. It is shown in [25] that the limit 
set of the asynchronous iterates {𝝅𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ can be characterized by the asymptotic analysis of the following ODI: 
𝑑𝝅𝑡
𝑑𝑡
∈ Ω|𝒮|
𝜏 . 𝐺(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅
𝑡). 
This procedure pays off in two ways: first, the analysis can be done by studying an ‘autonomous’ rather than a ‘non-
autonomous’ system; second, it extends the previous theory to also capture the behavior of asynchronous updates with 
‘set-valued’ mean fields. Moreover, as argued in [25], it only suffices to verify that 𝜏 is positive; i.e., to ensure that all 
the components of the iterates get updated some minimum proportion of time. The key advantage lies in that the exact 
value of 𝜏 does not need to be known, as the analysis will be conducted for every 𝜏 > 0. Now, recall from Lemma III 
that every 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 in CNRQ is, in fact, selected some minimum proportion of time, 𝜏 > 0.  
Armed with this understanding, we are now prepared to state Lemma V which corresponds to ([25], Assumption 
(B6́)). Define the correspondence Π𝑐𝑒(. ): 𝒸|𝒮×𝑨| ↦ Π𝝀 such that for all ?̂?𝑘 ∈ 𝒸
|𝒮×𝑨|, one has 𝝅 ∈ Π𝝀 is in Π𝑐𝑒(?̂?𝑘) if 
and only if it satisfies Definition 1 for CE policies. Π𝑐𝑒(. ) is an upper semi-continuous set-valued map (c.f, [15], 
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Lemma 14), such that for all ?̂?𝑘 ∈ 𝒸
|𝒮×𝑨|, Π𝑐𝑒(?̂?𝑘) is compact, convex, and non-empty (c.f., [15], Lemma 16). 
Lemma V. For all ?̂?𝑘 ∈ 𝒸
|𝒮×𝑨|, 
(a) the differential inclusion: 
?̇?𝒔
𝒕 =
𝑑𝝅𝒔
𝒕
𝑑𝑡
∈ Ω𝜏 . 𝐺𝑠(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅𝒔
𝒕),    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 
(42) 
is globally attracted by Π𝑐𝑒(?̂?𝑘). 
(b) 𝐹(?̂?𝑘 , Π
𝑐𝑒(?̂?𝑘)) is a convex map.  
Proof. Following [16],[17], the correspondence Π𝑐𝑒(?̂?𝑘) coincides with the set of no-regret policies; i.e., 
{𝝅 ∈ Π𝝀: ℛ𝑘,〈𝑎,?́?〉,𝑠(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) ≤ 0, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, ∀𝑎, ?́? ∈ 𝐴𝑘}, (43) 
where, for general ?̂?𝑘 ∈ 𝒸
|𝒮×𝑨| and 𝝅 ∈ Π𝝀, ℛ𝑘,〈𝑎,?́?〉,𝑠 is defined as: 
ℛ𝑘,〈𝑎,?́?〉,𝑠(?̂?𝑘, 𝝅) ≝ ∑ 𝝅𝑠(𝒂). [?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,?́?,𝒂−𝑘) − ?̂?𝑘,(𝑠,𝑎,𝒂−𝑘)],
𝒂∈𝑨:𝑎𝑘=𝑎
   ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, ∀𝑎, ?́? ∈ 𝐴𝑘 . (44) 
Equation (43) implies that the solutions to (42) steer the state-dependent regret matrix 𝑅𝑘,𝑠 to approach the closed 
negative orthant ℝ−
|𝐴𝑘×𝐴𝑘|, denoted for short by Θ. The analysis would be more direct if we consider the equivalent 
dynamics in the regret space; i.e., to show that for the solutions to (45) below: 
?̇?𝑘,𝑠
𝑡 =
𝑑𝑅𝑘,𝑠
𝑡
𝑑𝑡
∈ Ω𝜏. [ℛ𝑘,𝑠 (?̂?𝑘 , Ψ𝑠(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅
𝑡)) − 𝑅𝑘,𝑠
𝑡 ], (45) 
we have that: 
𝑅𝑘,〈𝑎,?́?〉,𝑠
𝑡 → Θ    𝑎𝑠    𝑡 → ∞, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, ∀𝑎, ?́? ∈ 𝐴𝑘 . 
Following ([25], Theorem 5.2), we now produce a Lyapunov function for (45) to show that Θ (resp. Π𝑐𝑒) is a global 
attractor for (45) (resp. (25)). Define: 
ℒ(𝑅𝑘) =
1
2
∑ [Υ(𝑅𝑘,〈𝑎,?́?〉,𝑠)]
2
𝑠∈𝒮,𝑎,?́?∈𝐴𝑘
. 
Clearly, ℒ ≥ 0, ℒ(Θ|𝒮|) = 0, and ∇ℒ(𝑅𝑘) = Υ(𝑅𝑘). To show that ℒ is a Lyapunov function for the ODI (28), one 
needs to verify for any fixed 𝜔𝑠 ∈ Ω
𝜏 and any ?́? ∈ Ψ𝑠(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅
𝑡): 
≺ ∇ℒ(𝑅𝑘), ?̇?𝑘
𝑡 ≻ =∑ ≺ Υ(𝑅𝑘,𝑠), 𝜔𝑠. [ℛ𝑘,𝑠(?̂?𝑘 , ?́?) − 𝑅𝑘,𝑠] ≻  < 0
𝑠∈𝒮
,   for ∀𝑅𝑘,𝑠 ∈ ℝ
|𝐴𝑘×𝐴𝑘|\Θ (46) 
where ≺. , . ≻ denotes the Frobenius inner product. It can be shown (c.f., Lemma B.1 in the supplementary materials of 
the paper) that ≺ Υ(𝑅𝑘,𝑠), ℛ𝑘,𝑠(?̂?𝑘 , ?́?) ≻ = 0 for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮; hence, (46) reduces to: −∑  ≺ Υ(𝑅𝑘,𝑠), 𝜔𝑠. 𝑅𝑘,𝑠 ≻𝑠∈𝒮  
which is clearly less than 0. This concludes part (a). 
As for part (b), the convexity of 𝐹(?̂?𝑘 , Π
𝑐𝑒(?̂?𝑘)) is immediate given that the function Η
𝜆𝑘 in the definition of 𝐹 is 
an affine function of ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘, and for any fixed ?̂?𝑘 ∈ 𝒸
|𝒮×𝑨|, ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘 reduces to a linear function of 𝝅 ∈ Π𝝀.    
Now remember from Lemma III that every state-action pair is used a minimum proportion of time, ?́? > 0. Define 
Ω|𝑨|
?́?  to be the |𝑨| × |𝑨| diagonal matrix of the form: Ω|𝑨|
?́? ∶= {𝜁1, … , 𝜁|𝑨|; 𝜁𝒂 ∈ [?́?, 1], ∀𝒂 ∈ 𝑨}. In light of ([25], Theorem 
4.7), under assumption (A1) and with Lemmas I to V holding, the linear interpolation of the iterative process in (33) is 
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an asymptotic pseudo-trajectory to the differential inclusion: 
𝑑?̂?𝑘,𝑠
𝑡
𝑑𝑡
∈ Ω|𝑨|
?́? . 𝐹𝑠(?̂?𝑘
𝑡 , Π𝑐𝑒),       for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 (47) 
where 𝐹𝑠 stands for the |𝑨|-vector of the 𝐹(𝑠,𝒂) terms; i.e., for any 𝝅
𝑐𝑒 ∈ Π𝑐𝑒 , 
𝐹𝑠(?̂?𝑘
𝑡 , 𝝅𝑐𝑒) = H𝑠
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘
𝑡 , 𝝅𝑐𝑒) − ?̂?𝑘,𝑠
𝑡 ,    for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 
and H𝑠
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘
𝑡 , 𝝅𝑐𝑒) is the |𝑨|-vector of  H(𝑠,𝒂)
𝜆𝑘 (?̂?𝑘
𝑡 , 𝝅𝑐𝑒) terms, defined in (37). 
The next lemma establishes the convergence of the {?̂?𝑘
𝑛}
𝑛∈ℕ
 iterates on the moderate time-scale. 
Lemma VI. 𝑄𝑘,𝑠
𝜆𝑘  (defined in (11)) is the unique global attractor of the differential inclusion (47). 
Proof. Clearly, H𝜆𝑘 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 , 𝝅) = 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 . Also, for any fixed 𝝅 ∈ Π𝝀, H𝑠
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) is a contraction mapping w.r.t. sup 
norm ‖. ‖∞ (e.g., see [22]); i.e., 
‖H𝑠
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) − H𝑠
𝜆𝑘 (?́̂?𝑘 , 𝝅)‖
∞
≤ 𝜌. ‖?̂?𝑘,𝑠 − ?́̂?𝑘,𝑠‖
∞
 ,    ∀?̂?𝑘 , ?́̂?𝑘 ∈ 𝒸
|𝒮×𝑨|. 
which means that 𝑄𝑘,𝑠
𝜆𝑘  is its unique fixed point. Now, for any fixed 𝜔 ∈ Ω|𝑨|
?́? , we have: 
𝜔. (H𝑠
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) − ?̂?𝑘,𝑠) = Η𝑠
𝜆𝑘,𝜔(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) − ?̂?𝑘,𝑠, 
where, Η𝑠
𝜆𝑘,𝜔(. ) ≝ (𝐈 − 𝜔). ?̂?𝑘,𝑠 +𝜔.H𝑠
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘, 𝝅). Since 𝜔’s diagonal elements are bounded by 1, it holds that: 
‖Η𝑠
𝜆𝑘,𝜔(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) − Η𝑠
𝜆𝑘,𝜔 (?́̂?𝑘 , 𝝅)‖
∞
≤ ?̅?. ‖?̂?𝑘,𝑠 − ?́̂?𝑘,𝑠‖
∞
 ,    ∀?̂?𝑘 , ?́̂?𝑘 ∈ 𝒸
|𝒮×𝑨|, 
where ?̅? ≝ 1 − 𝜁∗(1 − 𝜌) ∈ (0,1), and 𝜁∗ = max
𝑖
𝜁𝑖. Thus, Η𝑠
𝜆𝑘,𝜔(?̂?𝑘 , 𝝅) is also a contraction mapping, and 𝑄𝑘,𝑠
𝜆𝑘  is its 
unique fixed point; i.e., H𝜆𝑘,𝜔 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 , 𝝅) = 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘. From this, it follows that {?̂?𝑘
𝑛}
𝑛∈ℕ
 converge to true action values 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 
for any policy 𝝅 ∈ Π𝝀, and in particular for the CE policies in Π𝑐𝑒.   
Theorem II. The coupled process (?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) from (33) and (34) converges to the limit (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 , Π𝑐𝑒 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘)), where 
𝝅𝑐𝑒 ∈ Π𝑐𝑒 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘) is a stationary CE policy for the stochastic game 𝛤𝝀 with 𝜆𝑘-parameterized individual Lagrangian 
utilities and 𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘 is the associated Lagrangian state-action value function. 
Proof. Immediate by Lemma VI and ([25], Corollary 4.8).     
Theorem II establishes the convergence of {𝝅𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ to a small neighborhood of the set of CE in game 𝛤
𝝀. Hence, by 
Theorem I, ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) converges to the Lagrange dual function 𝒢𝑘(𝜆𝑘) that is equal to the primal maximum 
ℒ̆𝑘,?̆?𝑘
𝜆𝑘 (?̆?𝑘
∗) in view of the agents’ individual control problems in section II.A. With this equivalence in mind, the 
convergence of {𝜆𝑘
𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ to the set of dual minima 𝜆𝑘
∗ ∈ argmin
𝜆𝑘
𝒢𝑘,𝑠(𝜆𝑘) can be established similarly to [33]. More 
specifically, the mapping 𝜆𝑘 → 𝒢𝑘,𝑠(𝜆𝑘) is piecewise linear and convex for every state 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 and any agent 𝑘. Let ∇𝜆𝑘 
denote the gradient in the 𝜆𝑘 variable. We have ∇𝜆𝑘𝒢𝑘,𝑠(𝜆𝑘
𝑡 ) ∈ 𝜕𝒢𝑘,𝑠(𝜆𝑘
𝑡 ), where 𝜕𝒢 is the sub-differential of 𝒢. It then 
holds that [33] the stochastic (sub-)gradient iterations on {𝜆𝑘
𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ track the differential inclusion: 
−?̇?𝑘
𝑡 ∈ 𝜕𝒢𝑘,𝑠(𝜆𝑘
𝑡 )    for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 
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and therefore converges to the set of minima of 𝒢𝑘,𝑠 [33][33]. Combining this with Theorem II yields that (?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛, 𝜆𝑘
𝑛) 
converge to (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘
∗
, Π𝑐𝑒 (𝑄𝑘
𝜆𝑘
∗
) , 𝜆𝑘
∗ ), which is an alternative way of saying ℒ𝑘
𝜆𝑘(?̂?𝑘
𝑛, 𝝅𝑛) converges to ℒ̆𝑘
𝜆𝑘
∗
(?̆?𝑘
∗) 
associated with the saddle point of the individual agent’s long-term Lagrangian simultaneously for all agents 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. 
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we follow up on the example scenarios from Section II.C, and give numerical results on CNR𝑄 
learning algorithm. We conduct experiments for a two-tier network with four femto-cells and a single macro-cell. We 
investigate CNRQ’s convergence and also compare its social welfare with that computed from both the centralized and 
semi-distributed variants of the CE-Q learning algorithm both implemented with a utilitarian equilibrium selection 
mechanism [20]. In order to apply CE-Q to our constrained game example, we have adopted the Lagrangian approach 
similarly to CNRQ and have augmented CE-Q with Lagrange multiplier iterations that run on a slower timescale w.r.t. 
Q-value iterations. Since centralized CE-Q is convergent to stationary CE, this would result in proper handling of the 
constraints in the game; however, semi-distributed CE-Q is susceptible to mis-coordination, and convergence to CE is 
not guaranteed in general. This is also corroborated by our experiments in the downlink scenario in that semi-distributed 
CE-Q violates the constraint on MBS’s buffer length.  
TABLE IV 
SIMULATION PARAMETERS- UPLINK SCENARIO 
Symbol Quantity Value 
𝑁𝑜 noise power [mW] 10−7 
𝑎0
𝑢 MUE transmit power [mW]  5 
𝑎𝑘
𝑢, 𝑘 = 1…4 FUE transmit power [mW] {′𝑙𝑜𝑤′ ≝ 0,′ ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ′ ≝ 1}   
𝑔0𝑘
𝑢 , 𝑘 = 1…4 MUE-FBS channel gains (0.038, 0.082, 0.071, 0.086)  
 
ℎ𝑘?́?
𝑢 , 𝑘, ?́? = 1…4 
 
FUE-FBS channel gains 
 
(
0.44 0.10 0.02 0.10
0.07 0.23 0.03 0.06
0.10 0.10 0.25 0.10
0.10 0.05 0.09 0.24
) 
W bandwidth [MHz] 1  
?̅?𝑘
𝑢, 𝑘 = 1…4 mean FUE power constraint [mW] 0.75 
TABLE V 
SIMULATION PARAMETERS- DOWNLINK SCENARIO 
Symbol Quantity Value 
𝑎0
𝑑 MBS transmit power [mW]  500 
𝑎𝑘
𝑑 , 𝑘 = 1…4 FBS transmit power [mW] {0,10,100}  
𝑔0𝑘
𝑑 , 𝑘 = 1…4 MBS-FUE channel gains (0.003, 0.005, 0.008, 0.002)  
𝑔𝑘0
𝑑 , 𝑘 = 1…4 FBS-MUE channel gains (0.055, 0.051, 0.035, 0.012) 
 
ℎ𝑘?́?
𝑑 , 𝑘, ?́? = 1…4 
 
FBS-FUE channel gains 
 
(
0.68  0.09 0.03  0.04
0.07 0.82 0.04  0.04
0.01 0.04 0.16 0.03
0.03 0.08 0.01 0.29
) 
𝜏 timeslot duration [msec] 1  
𝜆 
MBS-to-MUE Poisson 
packet arrival rate [pkt/msec] 
5.5 
L packet size [bytes] 256  
?̅?0 
mean MBS buffer length 
constraint [pkt] 
10 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
 
(g) 
 
(h) 
 
(i) 
Fig. 2.  (a) FUEs’ marginal frequency of transmissions (uplink). (b) Individual FUE’s average rate utilities. (c) Average uplink social welfare. 
(d) Convergence of individual FUE’s average power consumption. (e) FBSs’ marginal frequency of transmissions (downlink). (f) Individual 
FBS’s average rate utilities. (g) Average downlink social welfare. (h) Convergence of MBS’s average buffer length. (i) Downlink social welfare 
vs. MBS traffic intensity (note the violation of constraint in semi-distributed CE-Q learning). 
First, consider the uplink HetNet setup from II.C.1. The simulation parameters are listed in Table IV. Fig. 2(a) and 
(b) exhibit the convergence behavior of CNRQ in this scenario. In Fig. 2(a), we plot the marginal empirical frequency 
of high power transmissions (action 𝑎𝑘
𝑢 = 1) by FUEs for both cases of MUE’s occupancy state. In Fig. 2(b), the 
progression of the average individual rate utility achieved by all FUEs is depicted. In Fig. 2(c), we compare CNRQ’s 
social welfare (measured in terms of the sum of FUEs rate utilities) with that obtained from both semi-distributed and 
centralized versions of the CE-Q algorithm. As can be seen, CNRQ outperforms semi-distributed CE-Q, but its social 
welfare is upper bounded by centralized CE-Q. We show in Fig. 2(d) the average power consumption by FUEs. To 
keep the figure from being cluttered, the results are shown only for FUEs 1 and 2. The imposed average power 
constraint (0.75 mW in Table IV) is respected asymptotically by all three algorithms.  
To experiment with the downlink setup, we use the simulation parameters listed in Table V. Fig. 2(e) shows the 
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convergence of marginal empirical frequency of play for action 𝑎𝑘
𝑑 = 10 [𝑚𝑊] by each FBS when the system state 
(i.e., MBS buffer length) is 𝑏0 = 5. Fig. 2(f) depicts the convergence of the average rate achieved by each individual 
FBS. In Fig. 2(g) and (h), we compare CNRQ’s social welfare and constraint satisfaction with the other two schemes. 
As evidenced, semi-distributed CE-Q, despite achieving a slightly higher average sum rate, has violated the constraint 
on average MBS buffer length by a relatively large margin. We also study the impact of the MBS’s Poisson traffic 
arrival rate on the downlink social welfare and on the constraint on MBS buffer length. To this end, the traffic intensity 
is varied from 4.5 pkt/msec to 8.5 pkt/msec. MBS buffer length constraint is consistently respected by both CNRQ and 
centralized CE-Q. However, as shown in Fig. 2(i), despite its high social welfare, semi-distributed CE-Q has 
consistently violated the constraint on buffer length. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We presented a constrained no-regret Q-learning (CNRQ) algorithm for the online computation of stationary CE in 
constrained general-sum stochastic games. CNRQ builds on previous ideas which involve two control loops consisting 
of Q-learning (outer-loop) for estimating action value functions and no-regret-learning (inner-loop) for estimating a 
CE policy. We employed the technique of timescale separation from stochastic approximation to allow for a single-
loop concurrent execution of Q-learning (on the slower timescale) and no-regret-learning (on the faster timescale), 
which eliminates the backstage virtual plays as required by prior art in inner-loop iterations. Moreover, by regarding 
distributed CE estimation as simultaneous primal maximization across all agents, we extended the algorithm for 
constrained setups as well. Thanks to our stochastic approximation-based expression of the learning process, the 
constrained extension comes as easily as introducing a slower third timescale to the operation of the algorithm for 
conducting dual descent in Lagrange multiplier space. Overall, CNRQ has been cast as a three-timescale asynchronous 
stochastic approximation with set-valued update increments. Unlike prior art which lacks a rigorous convergence 
analysis, we analyzed the asymptotic behavior of CNRQ using differential inclusion arguments. Our analysis draws on 
recent extensions of the theory of stochastic approximation to the case of asynchronous recursive inclusions with set-
valued mean fields. We also applied CNRQ-learning to an exemplary case of emerging wireless HetNet deployments.  
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